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The production and consumption of environmental goods and services are subject to many of the problems associated 
with public goods. Due to their non-rival and non-excludable nature, incentives for individuals to invest in their production 
are often absent. To address this market failure, government agencies have used a number of policy mechanisms to 
procure the supply of environmental outcomes on behalf of society. Recently, conservation tenders focussing on private 
land have been a favoured policy instrument used by many government agencies to purchase environmental outcomes in 
the public interest. The majority of these environmental tenders have focussed on a single environmental outcome. 
 
It  is  contended  in  this  paper  that  multiple  environmental  outcomes  tenders  can  be  more  cost-effective  than  single 
outcome tenders as decisions are based on information regarding a wider set of environmental outcomes – a more 
complete picture. Tenders that focus on more than one outcome capitalise on economies of scope in the production of 
environmental outcomes, as well as incorporating synergies and trade-offs into decision making. 
 
In this paper the results from a synthetic analysis of the benefits derived from running multiple-outcome tenders are 
compared to single outcome tenders, to empirically estimate potential cost-effectiveness gains. The baseline policy of 
running a multiple-outcome tender is compared to three alternative policy options: running a single outcome tender, 
running three single outcome tenders simultaneously, and running three single outcome tenders consecutively. 
 
Results indicate that significant cost effectiveness gains can be made by running a multiple-outcome tender compared to 
the three policy alternatives. These results are analysed, and advantages and limitations of applying multiple-outcome 
tenders in the field are discussed. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
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Background 
 
Uniform payment policies  (or fixed price grants schemes) and  conservation tenders are two policy 
mechanisms  that  have  been  used  by  government  agencies  to  procure  environmental  goods  and 
services on private land in the public interest. Historically, uniform payment policies have been the 
primary  mechanism  used  for  purchasing  public  environmental  benefits  on  private  land  (Latacz-
Lohmann  and  Hodge,  2003).  However,  these  policies  have  been  criticised  on  the  premise  that 
asymmetric  information  between  the  landholder  and  implementing  agency  on  the  true  costs  of 
management interventions may result in landholders being overpaid for the tasks they perform – an 
increased cost to government (Stoneham et al, 2003).  
 
More recently in Australia, conservation tenders have been used increasingly in an attempt to cost-
effectively purchase environmental benefits on private land (Windle and Rolfe, 2008).  In these tenders, 
landholders submit a bid outlining the payment they require to undertake a given set of actions, and 
some form of scientific metric is used to predict the public environmental benefit resulting from those 
actions.  Bids  are  then  ranked  from  lowest  to  highest  cost  per  unit  environmental  benefit  –  an 
environmental  benefit  supply  curve.  Bids  are  selected  along  this  supply  curve  until  the  budget  is 
exhausted (or the reserve price is exceeded).  
 
In this paper the notion of cost effectiveness is used often. Cost effectiveness differs from economic 
efficiency.    Cost  effectiveness  relates  to  the  unit  cost  to  the  agency  of  procuring  environmental 
outcomes. Government – acting on behalf of the general public – is concerned with cost effectiveness 
because they aim to procure environmental outcomes in a manner that represents value for money. 
For economic efficiency, the sum of the surplus to the landholder and the agency is maximised.  
 
Tenders increase the cost-effectiveness to agencies of purchasing public environmental benefits from 
landholders, compared to traditional grants schemes, in the following ways: 
1.  Introducing  competition  to  provide  incentives  for  land-holders  to  reveal  information  on  their 
opportunity cost, and 
2.  Using scientific metrics alongside information on bids to separate high and low cost suppliers of 
environmental benefit (Connor et al, 2008). 
 
The  majority  of  conservation  tenders  implemented  in  Australia  have  focussed  on  a  single 
environmental outcome. In Victoria, BushTender, River Tender and Wetland Tender focus on native 
vegetation, rivers and wetlands respectively1. In addition, carbon outcomes have been purchased to 
offset  Victorian  Government  vehicle  emissions2.    Conservation  tenders  have  been  shown  to  yield 
significant  efficiency  gains  over  uniform  payment  policies  (Stoneham  et  al,  2003).  However,  many 
environmental outcomes are jointly produced, and in single outcome tenders efficiency gains from 
selecting the best sites based on a more complete picture of the environmental outcomes produced 
may  be  forgone.  It  is  contended  in  this  paper  that  the  cost-effectiveness  gains  from  running  a 
conservation  tender  over  a  traditional  grants  approach  can  be  improved  upon  by  considering 
different environmental outcomes together. 
 
The potential for considering more than one environmental outcome relating from a change in land 
management  has  been  highlighted  in  the  literature  (Woodward,  2010;  Strappazzon  et  al,  2003). 
                                                 
1  Recent River Tenders have commenced implementation in Wimmera, Glenelg Hopkins and North East Catchment 
Management Authorities in 2009. Recent Wetland Tenders commenced implementation in Wimmera, Glenelg Hopkins and 
Corangamite Catchment Management Authorities in 2009. Recent BushTenders have been run Mallee, Wimmera, Goulburn 
Broken and North Central Catchment Management Authorities from 2008 to 2011. 
2 The most recent VicFleet Tender was held in 2010. Freedom of trade between states prevented DSE from restricting 
eligibility to Victoria, even though some weight was given to environmental benefits. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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(Woodward,  2010)  shows  that  when  caps  are  set  correctly3  for  multiple  cap  and  trade  schemes, 
allowing land holders to sell permits in multiple markets, or ‘double dip’, will maximise aggregate net 
benefits.  In  (Strapazzon  et  al,  2003)  it  is  found  that  allocating  property  rights  for  a  second  good 
produced as a by-product of production of biodiversity in an auction setting, to landholders improves 
efficiency in comparison to allocating the property right to the environmental agency. This difference 
in efficiency is attributed to asymmetric information about the landholders’ ability to maximise profit in 
supplying a portfolio of outcomes (Strapazzon et al, 2003). In (Stoneham, 2007) empirical results from 
an EcoTender pilot are used to support the notion that paying landholders for carbon sequestered 
(simulating a carbon market) in addition to their bid, results in a lower procurement cost to the agency. 
 
The  Victorian  Government’s  EcoTender  is  a  conservation  auction  that  focuses  on  multiple 
environmental  outcomes  (Eigenraam  et  al,  2006).  In  EcoTender,  outcomes  relating  to  native 
vegetation, rivers, wetlands, and catchment health (erosion, recharge and run-off) are targeted. The 
environmental benefit unit used in ranking (EBI) is a weighted sum of the component scores. Targeting 
multiple environmental outcomes in a single tender would provide incentives for landholders to choose 
a bundle of environmental goods to that maximises their expected tender pay-off. This saving could 
be shared between multiple investors focussing on single environmental outcomes reducing the cost 
to  all  parties.  The  EcoTender  conservation  auction  has  been  shown  to  result  in  lower  unit  cost  of 
environmental  benefit  than  if  the  same  bids  are  selected  on  the  basis  of  only  one  environmental 




Landholder  bids  consist  of  a  bid  price  and  a  suite  of  management  actions  that  the  landholder 
commits to undertake should they be successful. For the same set of landholder bids, tenders focussing 
on  different  environmental  outcomes  will  yield  different  supply  curves.  It  is  likely  (although  not 
necessary)  that  the  rankings  of  landholders  will  differ  between  supply  curves  for  different 
environmental outcomes. 
 
When information on preferences for each environmental benefit is known, it is possible to purchase 
the collection of bids that maximise total net benefit to society within a given budget constraint. This is 
achieved by selecting the combination of bids from the production possibilities frontier that results in 
the bundle of environmental outcomes sitting on the outermost indifference curve. This is illustrated for 
two environmental goods ‘a’ and ‘b’ in figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 1 – Optimal bundle of environmental outcomes from tender with two environmental outcomes 
   
                                                 
3 It is stated in (Woodard, 2010) that the authors believe that in reality caps are rarely set optimally for multiple pollutants. 
Co-ordination between programs is required to set the caps optimally. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
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In (a) and (b) of Figure 1, the three parallel lines represent society’s indifference curves over bundles of 
goods ‘a’ and ‘b’. Each point on the graph represents the bundle of goods obtained from selecting a 
combination of bids from the pool of all available bids such that the total cost does not exceed the 
tender budget. The dark points represent the combinations of bids that have the property there is no 
alternative combination of bids that yields strictly higher quantities of both goods within the budget 
constraint. In other words, a dominating combination of bids cannot be obtained without exceeding 
the tender budget.  
 
The point x* in each diagram denotes the optimal combination of bids within the budget constraint. In 
1(a) the goods are produced independently and in 1(b) the goods are produced jointly. When the 
goods are produced independently,  costs are generally expected to increase as the quantities of 
each good increase. When goods are jointly produced, it may be more expensive (or even impossible) 
to  produce  one  good  without  producing  the  other.  This  can  be  seen  in  1(b)  where  there  are  no 
combinations of bids within the budget constraint with high values of one good and low values of the 
other.  
 
In reality, some actions may produce outcomes jointly, while others produce outcomes independently. 
Each landholder has a suite of management actions available to them. Some of these actions may 
yield multiple benefits and others may result in a single benefit. Landholders face incentives to select 
the  management  actions  that  maximise  their  expected  private  benefit4.  Consequently  in  an 
environmental tender a mixture of bids for single and multiple-outcomes may be received. These bids 
will be influenced by the nature of the tender. In a single outcome tender the landholder will select 
management actions with regard to the outcome being targeted and will disregard other outcomes. 
In  a  multiple-outcome  tender  the  landholder  will  choose  management  actions  with  regard  to  all 
environmental goods targeted in the tender. The weightings applied to each outcome in the metric 
will influence the landholders choice of actions to undertake.  
There is much missing information on community preferences between environmental outcomes. In 
multiple-outcome  tenders  different  outcomes  are  often  weighted  linearly,  leading  to  linear 
indifferences curves. The linearity of these indifference curves may be a reasonable assumption as it is 
often the case that a tender represents such a small quantity of overall environmental targets that a 
linear approximation is adequate. Moreover, if the targets are very far from being reached, diminishing 
marginal returns may not be relevant.  
 
The weightings an agency gives to each environmental outcome in a tender defines the derivative of 
the  linear  indifference  surface.  Consider  a  vector  ) ,... ( 1
~
n a a a =   of  environmental  outcomes.  Let 
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4 Private benefit obtained by the landholder is equal to their expected tender pay-off plus any additional private benefit 
gained from undertaking the given management actions. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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Single outcome tenders are the special case where all but one of the weights  i w  are equal to zero. In 
this case the indifference sets will be of the form:  { } c a R a i
n = ∈ | (
~
 where  + ∈R c . In the case where 
there are two environmental goods produced and all weight in the metric is assigned to one good, the 
indifference curves will be lines perpendicular to the good targeted in the tender. Figure two below 
shows the  intersection  of the  production  possibilities  frontier with  linear  indifference  curves  resulting 
from a metric that is a weighted combination of goods “a’ and ‘b’. 
 
Figure 2 – Optimal bundle of environmental outcomes from tender with two environmental outcomes 
and linear metric. 
 
In Figure 2, the slope of the agencies indifference curve is given by the quotient of the weightings of 
good ‘b’ and good ‘a’ in the agencies scientific metric. 
 
Tenders with different weightings for environmental outcomes will have different supply curves, even if 
they  are  constructed  from  the  same  bids.  To  see  this  we  first  consider  a  simple  example  with  two 
tenders that each focus on a single outcome. Suppose that one tender focuses on carbon (C) and a 
second  tender  focuses  on  terrestrial  environmental  benefit  (EB).  In  this  example  there  are  five 
landholders offering bundles of terrestrial and carbon benefit. The bid prices and quantities of the two 
benefits are given in table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 – landholder bid price, carbon and terrestrial benefits 
 
Bid  Price  Carbon (C)  Terrestrial (EB) 
1  1000  100  75 
2  600  20  20 
3  1000  60  100 
4  500  20  30 
5  250  20  5 
 
Supply  curves  for  both  carbon  and  terrestrial  environmental  benefit  can  be  constructed  from  this 
information  by  selecting  bids  in  order  of  highest  to  lowest  cost  per  unit  carbon  and  cost  per  unit 
terrestrial benefit respectively. The carbon and terrestrial EB supply curves are given in Figure 3 below. 
 Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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It is clear from Figure 3 that the order of the bids in the carbon and terrestrial tender is different. In 
figure 4, a supply curve for a multiple-outcome tender focussing on carbon and terrestrial biodiversity 
where each good is weighted at equally is given. It can be seen that this tender yields a supply curve 
that differs from both the carbon and terrestrial supply curves. 
 
Figure 4 – supply curve for weighted carbon and terrestrial tender 
 
Changing the weightings of environmental outcomes in a tender may result in a change in the tender 
supply curve and therefore the choice of successful bids. If the weightings in the tender do not reflect 




As discussed in the background section, economic theory suggests that multiple-outcome tenders 
allow the agency to capitalise on economies of scope resulting from joint production of environmental 
outcomes. In this paper synthetic data with characteristics derived from real tender data is used to 
investigate potential cost savings to agencies from running multiple-outcome tenders. Empirical 
information from the West Gippsland EcoTender demonstration is used to create the synthetic dataset 
used in the comparison.  
 Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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Monte Carlo simulations are used to run multiple iterations of cost effectiveness comparisons involving 
single and multiple-outcome tenders using synthetic data. The aim of this investigation is to use 
synthetically generated data to test the theory that multiple-outcome tenders can provide cost 
effectiveness gains over single outcome tenders. The rationale behind using synthetic data over real 
data in this analysis is that Monte Carlo results provide a distribution of results over the simulation data 




Results presented in this paper rely on the following assumptions: 
1.  scoring systems (metrics) exist that can accurately predict and score environmental outcomes 
resulting from on-site management actions; 
2.  the population of scores for all components are distributed normally with the same co-efficient of 
variation as the West Gippsland EcoTender sample dataset5;  
3.  the utility function of the procuring agency is such that ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ 
units are valued equally.  
4.  the agency obtains constant utility for each additional unit of ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and 





In Monte Carlo analysis data is generated randomly from pre-defined distributions for each iteration of 
the simulation. Multiple iterations are run and summary statistics are calculated for the simulation 
results. In each iteration, a randomly generated synthetic dataset is used to simulate landholder bids, 
area and environmental benefit scores per unit area. In this analysis, distributions of unit environmental 
benefit scores for ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ benefits are each generated randomly from 
datasets that are normally distributed with a mean of 50. The standard deviation of each distribution is 
defined so that the coefficient of variation6 in the distribution matches the coefficient of variation in 
the West Gippsland EcoTender empirical dataset7.  
 
To reflect the fact that only some sites are adjacent to a river and have a river benefit (40 percent in 
West Gippsland EcoTender) each site is given a river flag – a random number drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 100.  Sites with a river flag less than or equal to 40 are assigned a unit river 
score from the distribution. Sites with a river flag greater than 40 are deemed to be not adjacent to a 
river and are assigned a river score of zero. Similarly, to represent the fact that only 60 percent of sites 
in the West Gippsland EcoTender demonstration sequestered carbon, a carbon flag is assigned in the 
same manner. Sites with a carbon flag of less than or equal to 60 are deemed to sequester carbon 
and are assigned a unit carbon score. Sites with a carbon flag of greater than 60 are deemed not to 
sequester any carbon. 
 
Each site is assigned an area score from a normal distribution where the mean and standard deviation 
are taken from the empirical data.8 
 
                                                 
5 The actual distributions may vary slightly from normal as a result of clipping the random variables at a very low positive 
value. 
 
6 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. It is a normalised measure of dispersion. 
7 The distributions for unit environmental benefit scores are clipped at .01 to avoid the generation of negative scores. 
8 Where a negative number is generated for the area, it is replaced with .2Ha – the minimum area for eligibility in the West 
Gippsland EcoTender. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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In this analysis, a budget of $3,000,000 was used and data was generated for 300 landholders. This 
budget and number of participants was constructed to create a similar ratio of landholders to budget 
as the West Gippsland Ecotender.  A normal distribution modelled on the WG EcoTender data was 
used generate bid data per unit area for each landholder.  
 
In each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, a dataset is generated and that dataset is used to 
simulate a baseline multiple-outcome tender. The same dataset is used to simulate each of the 
following policy alternatives:  
1.  single outcome tenders for each outcome, each using the total budget; 
2.  three consecutive tenders assigning one third of the budget to each; and  
3.  three separate tenders assigning 1/3 of the budget to each. 
 
Baseline Mechanism: multiple-outcome tender  
 
In a multiple-outcome tender the environmental benefit score is defined to be the sum of the ‘native 
vegetation’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ scores. To simulate a multiple-outcome tender, the site data is ranked 
in ascending order by bid price per unit EBS and bids are selected along this multiple-outcome supply 
curve until there are insufficient funds to select the next bid. The total ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’, 
‘carbon’ and ‘EBS’  is calculated for the simulated multiple-outcome tender.  
 
1. Single outcome tender  
  
To simulate a single outcome terrestrial tender, the site data is ranked by cost/terrestrial score and bids 
are selected down the list until there are insufficient funds to select the next bid. The total EBS is 
calculated for the simulated Terrestrial Tender. Analogous simulations are conducted ranking by 
‘cost/river’ and ‘cost/carbon’ scores to simulate single outcome tenders for ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ 
respectively. The percentage additional EBS that is obtained in the baseline compared to the single 








2. Consecutive single outcome tenders  
 
To simulate three single outcome tenders ran consecutively (terrestrial then river then carbon) one third 
of the budget is allocated for each tender. To simulate a terrestrial biodiversity tender, the site data is 
ranked by cost/terrestrial benefit unit and bids are selected down the list until there are insufficient 
funds to select the next bid. The sites that were not selected in the simulated terrestrial tender are 
ranked in ascending order by cost/river benefit unit. Sites are selected down the list until the selection 
of an additional site would exceed the ‘river’ budget. Sites that were not selected in the river tender 
are then ranked on their unit carbon cost. Sites are selected down this list until the carbon budget is 
exhausted. The total EBS for the three consecutive tenders is the sum of the EBS obtained in each 
individual tender:  carbon river veg native NVRivCar EBS EBS EBS EBS + + =  
 
The percentage additional EBS that is obtained in the baseline compared to three consecutive 
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3. Separate single outcome tenders  
 
To simulate three tenders being run separately, one third of the landholders are assigned9 to 
participate in each of ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ tenders. One third of the budget is 
allocated to each tender.  To simulate a ‘native vegetation’ tender, the first group is ranked by 
cost/terrestrial benefit unit and bids are selected down the list until there are insufficient funds to select 
the next bid. Similarly to simulate ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ tenders, the second and third groups are ranked 
by cost/’river’ benefit and cost/’carbon’ benefit respectively and bids are selected down these lists 
until there are insufficient funds to select the next bids. The total EBS for the separate tenders is 
calculated as follows:  
 
carbon river l vegetation native seperate EBS EBS EBS EBS + + =  
 
The percentage additional EBS that is obtained in the baseline compared to running the three tenders 









The distributions of total environmental benefit score (EBS) for simulations of the baseline multiple-
outcome tender against each of the policy alternatives; a single outcome tender, 3 consecutive 
tenders, and 3 concurrent tenders, are presented in figure 5 below.  
Figure 5 – Simulation distributions for environmental benefit scores 
                                                 
9 The site data is randomly divided into three datasets consisting of 1/3 of landholders each. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
 





Higher scores are expected in multiple-
outcome tenders than the 3 single 
outcome alternatives. Distributions for 






Slightly higher scores are obtained in the 
multiple-outcome tender than the 




Significantly higher scores are obtained in 
the multiple-outcome tender compared 
to running ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and 
‘carbon’ tenders separately. 
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The increase in environmental benefit scores observed in the simulation results are presented in tables 1-3 
below. Information on the breakdown of terrestrial biodiversity, river and carbon scores is given in Appendix 1.  
 
Table 1 – EBS gains from running a multiple-outcome tender over a single outcome tender (option 1). 
 
  Native vegetation 
tender 
River tender  Carbon tender 
Mean percentage increase 
EBS
10 
12%  88%  42% 




3%-32%  39%-206%  17%-97% 
 
Table 2 – EBS gains from running a multiple-outcome tender over three consecutive single outcome tenders 
(option 2). 
 




consecutive tender (carbon,  river, 
native vegetation) 




2%  2% 




0-6%  0-7% 
 
Table 3 – EBS gains from running a multiple-outcome tender over three concurrent single outcome tenders 
(option 3). 
 
Tender  consecutive tender (native vegetation, river, carbon) 











                                                 
10 Average percentage increase in EBS obtained from running a multiple outcome tender over an alternative policy option 
using the simulation data. 
11 Lowest to highest percentage increase in EBS obtained from running a multiple outcome tender over an alternative policy 
option using the simulation data. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
 




These results indicate that there is potential for government agencies to purchase environmental 
benefit units at a lower unit cost using multiple-outcome tenders than using any of: one single outcome 
tender, multiple consecutive tenders, and multiple single outcome tenders. In addition, the results show 
that the savings obtained can vary widely depending on the specific bids received in an iteration. 
 
Conditional probability  
 
When interpreting the results from this simulation it is important to recognise that restricting eligibility to 
riparian sites, or sites that sequester carbon has an impact on the distribution of environmental benefit 
scores that satisfy eligibility requirements. The lowest (best) rankings for ‘river’ must have non-zero 
scores for at least two outcomes (terrestrial and ‘river’). Similarly the lowest rankings for ‘carbon’ must 
have at least two outcomes (terrestrial and carbon). Intuitively, it would be expected that EBS scores 
should be higher for sites that have two or more outcomes on average. 
 
To formalise this idea, we first consider the expected value of an environmental benefit score for a site 
given no information about the number of outcomes obtained. The expected value of the EBS can be 
defined in terms of means of the probability density functions from which the data is generated. In 
symbols:  
 
)] ( ) ( ) ( [ 24 . )] ( ) ( [ 16 . )] ( ) ( [ 36 . ) ( 24 . ) ( Car Riv Ter Riv Ter Car Ter Ter EBS X X X X X X X X X Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε = Ε  
 
Where  
, , , Riv Ter EBS X X X and 
Car X are random variables for ‘EBS’, ‘terrestrial’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ scores 
respectively. Recall that the distributions from which the simulation data is generated have a mean of 
50 for each outcome. Hence we have  50 ) ( ) ( ) ( = Ε = Ε = Ε Car Riv Ter X X X . Therefore  100 ) ( = Ε EBS X . Given no 
information about the number of outputs on a site, the site has an expected environmental benefit 
score of 100. 
 
Now consider a site that is known to sequester carbon. The expected EBS for a site, conditional on that 




)] ( ) ( ) ( [ 24 . )] ( ) ( [ 36 .
) ( =
Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε
= Ε
Car Riv Ter Car Ter C
EBS
X X X X X
X  
 
Similarly, the expected EBS for a site given that site is known to be riparian is calculated by: 
130
4 .
)] ( ) ( ) ( [ 24 . )] ( ) ( [ 16 .
) ( =
Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε + Ε
= Ε
Car Riv Ter Car Ter R
EBS
X X X X X
X . 
 
This idea can easily be extended to show that EBS is positively correlated with the number of outcomes 
observed on the site. However, setting an eligibility requirement for ‘carbon’ or ‘river’ has an opposing 
effect of reducing the pool of sites eligible for selection. That may lead to forgoing low bid per unit EBS 
options. This notion is discussed in the next section. 
 
(1) One single outcome tender 
 
The percentage gains in environmental benefit score obtained from running a multiple-outcome 
tender compared to each of ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’ tenders were significant in all 
cases but much higher for ‘carbon and river’ than ‘native vegetation’. There are two important and 
competing factors influencing the cost-effectiveness gains from running multiple-outcome tenders 
over single outcome tenders. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
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The first is that there is substantial variation in the cost data as well as the EBS data (excluding the score 
for the outcome that is being focussed on). Restricting eligibility to sites that are adjacent to a river (40 
percent) or sites that sequester carbon (60 percent) results in the exclusion of many low cost sites. As all 
sites have a ‘terrestrial’ score, all sites are eligible for selection in a terrestrial tender increasing the 
chance of low cost sites being selected over river and carbon tenders where only some sites are 
eligible for selection. To formalise this idea first consider a terrestrial tender. Unit bids for ‘terrestrial’ and 
‘environmental benefit’ are both dependent on the following generated data: 
1.  bid per unit area 
2.  terrestrial score per unit area 
 
Consequently there is a positive correlation between unit bids for ‘terrestrial benefit’ and 
‘environmental benefit’. In other words, if two sites are selected from the bids such that  
 
) 2 ( ) 1 ( site Rank site Rank EBS EBS <  then it follows that: 
5 . )) 2 ( ) 1 ( Pr( > < site Rank site Rank Terestrial Terestrial . 
 
Now consider a river tender. Again suppose that two sites are selected such that 
) 2 ( ) 1 ( site Rank site Rank EBS EBS < . However, only 40 percent of sites have a non-zero river score. That 
is: 
 
4 . 0 6 . 0 1 )) 2 ( ) 1 ( Pr( = − < < site Rank site Rank River River  
 
Our lower bound on the probability of site 1 having a larger river score than site 2 (resulting from the 
positive correlation between unit bids for ‘river’ and ‘environmental benefit’) is as follows: 
 
2 . 0 5 . ) 6 . 0 1 ( )) 2 ( ) 1 ( Pr( = × − > < site Rank site Rank River River  
 
Consequently if site 1 is known to have a lower unit cost for EBS than site 2, the probability of site 1 also 
having a lower unit bid for terrestrial is in the range from 0.5 to 1, where the probability of site 1 having 
a lower unit bid for ‘river’ is in the lower range from 0.2 to 0.4. This idea can be extended naturally to 
tender selection; given that a site is selected in a multiple-outcome tender, the probability of that site 
being selected in a terrestrial tender is higher than the probability of that site being selected in a river 
tender. The same line of reasoning yields the following upper and lower bounds for carbon; given that 
) 2 ( ) 1 ( site Rank site Rank EBS EBS < , then 
 
  6 . 0 4 . 0 1 )) 2 ( ) 1 ( Pr( = − < < site Rank site Rank Carbon Carbon  
and 
  3 . 0 5 . ) 4 . 0 1 ( )) 2 ( ) 1 ( Pr( = × − > < site Rank site Rank Carbon Carbon  
 
Hence the probability of site 1 having a greater river score, given a greater EBS is in the range from 0.3 
to o.6. Consequently the expected gains from running a multiple-outcome tender are likely to be 
largest when compared to a river tender and smallest when compared to a terrestrial tender12,13. This 
corresponds to the simulation results. 
                                                 
12 These bounds could be narrowed given information on correlations between scores. 
13 Because the intersection of the ranges for Pr(River(site 2)>River(Site 2)| EBS(site 1)>EBS (site 2)) and Pr(Terrestrial 
(site 2)>River(Site 2)| EBS(site 1)>EBS (site 2)) is 0 we can conclude that the expected gain (in a randomly generated Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment Victoria 
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(2) Three consecutive single outcome tenders 
 
The three consecutive tenders demonstrated the smallest cost-effectiveness gain over the multiple-
outcome tender out of all policy options. The average gain in EBS was 2 percent for both orderings of 
consecutive single outcome tenders. In this option all possible sites are eligible for consideration in at 
least two of the individual tenders (terrestrial and one other). We formalise this notion below. 
 
Let  EBS S  be the event of a site being selected in a multiple environmental outcome tender. Denote 
the event of a site being selected in three consecutive tenders (terrestrial, river, carbon) with one third 
of the budget allocated to each by  utive con S sec . Similarly let  Terestrial S , River S  and  Carbon S  be the event of 
being selected in terrestrial, river and carbon tenders respectively, with one third of the tender budget. 
Then we have that: 
 
) | Pr( ) | Pr( ) | Pr( ) | Pr(
' ' '
sec River Terestrial EBS Carbon Terestrial EBS River EBS Terestrial EBS utive con S S S S S S S S S S S ∩ ∩ + ∩ + =  
 
If a site has a high score for any one of the single outcomes in relation to their bid price they are likely 
to be selected using a consecutive tender mechanism. The sites that will be selected in a multiple-
outcome tender and rejected in the consecutive tender policy will be sites that rank fairly well in 
multiple categories, but not well enough to be selected in any of the consecutive tenders. It should be 
noticed that this policy favours the outcome that is tendered last, as outcomes that would have been 
selected in more than one ranking are purchased from the earlier tender budget. 
 
While this policy option appears to be only slightly less cost effective than a multiple-outcome tender 
on the basis of on-site costs, there may be significant transaction costs associated with running three 
consecutive tenders. Once off administrative costs such as advertising and probity may be duplicated. 
Moreover, site visits and communications with landholders may be repeated for sites that are not 
selected in the first tender. 
 
(3) Three simultaneous single outcome tenders 
 
The simulation results showed that running three separate tenders was significantly less cost-effective 
than running one multiple-outcome tender. It was shown that running a multiple-outcome tender 
yielded an average 42 percent gain in EBS with a range of 12-100 percent in comparison to dividing 
the budget in three and running the three tenders separately.  
 
In the simultaneous tender policy, each site is assigned to a tender with a probability of one third for 
each of ‘terrestrial’, ‘river’ and ‘carbon’. Consequently the probability of a site being successful when 
randomly assigned to one of three separate tenders, given that it would be successful in a multiple-











) | Pr( tan EBS Carbon EBS River EBS Terestrial EBS eous simul S S S S S S S S + + = . 
 
 
Suppose a site has a low bid per unit EBS which breaks down to a very low bid per unit river outcome 
and moderate to high bids per unit for the remaining outcomes. Unless the site is assigned to the 
tender for ‘river’ outcomes, it is unlikely to be selected in the simultaneous tender policy. As there is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
dataset) in EBS from running a multiple tender over a river tender will be strictly larger than is gained from running a 
multiple tender over a terrestrial tender.  Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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only a chance of one third, that the site is assigned to the river tender, the site is more likely to be 
rejected. 
  
In this policy, a site with a low bid per unit EBS may not be selected for several reasons. Firstly the site 
may be allocated to a tender for an outcome where the site scores lowly. In particular, if a high EBS 
site is allocated to a tender for ‘carbon’ or ‘river’ and does not have a carbon or river score 
respectively, it is ineligible for selection. Secondly, the site may perform moderately high across all 
outcomes, however not high enough to be selected on the basis of any single outcome. 
 
In reality, while landholders may not fully understand the relative benefits resulting from their actions 
across environmental outcomes, they may have some information that allows them to self-select into a 
tender that would maximise their expected pay-off. Factoring some level of self selection into the 




Currently most conservation tenders run in Australia focus on a single environmental outcome. The 
results of this simulation indicate that there is a potential for cost-effectiveness gains to be made from 
collaborating to implement multiple-outcome tenders.  
 
More generally, this work indicates that cost-effectiveness gains can be made from factoring joint 
production into decisions, not just in tenders.  For example rules surrounding the ‘additionally’ of 
carbon can have the consequence of eliminating suppliers who can jointly produce carbon alongside 
other environmental goods. This precludes government and offset buyers teaming up to purchase 
carbon and other environmental goods together and sharing the cost savings. The elimination of these 
low cost suppliers may result in a higher carbon price and a lower uptake of environmental plantings 
than is socially optimal. 
 
While increased cost-effectiveness may be a driver for implementing multiple-outcome tenders, there 
are also barriers to this approach. It is often the case that different sections of government have 
responsibility for different outcomes. To adopt a multiple-outcome approach, co-ordination between 
these different sections is required. This can be particularly difficult if the different sections of 
government have already identified priority geographic areas for works that don’t overlap.  
 
In cases where different agencies are responsible for procuring different outcomes, there is a risk to 
agencies participating in a multiple-outcome tender that little or none of their funds is spent on their 
desired outcome. This can occur when an outcome is more expensive than expected, or when an 
outcome is underweighted in the tender metric. As the relative costs of each outcome are unknown a 
priori, it is not possible to set the metrics weightings to ensure that a percentage of the budget is spent 
on a particular outcome. 
 
While this paper focuses on a metric driven multiple-outcome tender, it would also be possible to run a 
multiple-outcome tender where the budget breakdown defines the quantity of each outcome 
purchased. For example, consider a multiple-outcome tender focussing on carbon and terrestrial 
biodiversity with agencies responsible for each outcome contributing half the budget each. The bids 
could be ranked twice – by cost per unit carbon and cost per unit terrestrial. Bids that would be 
accepted in each list, given the respective budget allocations are accepted. Bids that are listed in 
both lists could be cost-shared (half from each agency). The money each agency saves from the cost-
sharing can be added to the respective agency budgets and more bids can be selected. This process 
is repeated until the additional budget yields no bids chosen by both agencies. This method is 
guaranteed to result in a unit cost to each agency that is no worse than if they implemented a single Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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outcome tender14. However, requiring that the percentage of the budget focussed on each outcome 
adds an additional constraint to the system reducing the flexibility of the agency(s) to trade-off 
between outcomes. 
 
Transaction costs should also be considered when assessing tender options. Further to joint production 
benefits, multiple-outcome tenders may result in reductions in fixed costs (for example, administration 
and advertising) from economies of scale could be made by running one multiple-outcome tender 
instead of running multiple tenders separately. On the other hand, if running a multiple-outcome 
tenders results in significantly higher transaction costs (for example more costly site assessments from 
assessing multiple-outcomes instead of one) cost-effectiveness gains can be eroded. A multiple-
outcome tender should only be implemented if the additional benefits outweigh the increased 
transaction costs.  
 
Conclusion, limitations and further work 
 
This work has indicated that there may be cost effectiveness gains from considering multiple-outcomes 
together. However multiple-outcome tenders require agencies to have information on their relative 
preferences for different outcomes. This information is often absent, although it should be noted that 
these decisions are already being made implicitly when funds are allocated to divisions in charge of 
different outcomes. Further work in determining this demand side information is required to inform 
multiple-outcome tenders (as well as better funding decisions).  
 
This work has also demonstrated that cost-effectiveness gains from running a multiple outcome tender 
over the three policy alternatives can vary significantly across draws from the same underlying 
distributions. This shows that the exact gains from running a multiple outcome tender can vary 
considerably depending on the specific combinations of bids and environmental benefits received in 
a tender. This suggests that empirical work on cost effectiveness based on a single instance of bid and 
environmental benefit data should be interpreted with caution. 
 
A limitation of this model is that bidder behaviour is likely to change based on the type of tender the 
government agency is running. Using the language of game theory, bidder behaviour can be thought 
of as a two stage sequential game where the government agency moves first, choosing the type of 
tender from a range of possible options (eg, ‘native vegetation’, ‘river’, ‘carbon’, and ‘multiple’). The 
landholder will move second choosing the suite of management actions they will undertake and their 
bid price. The landholders move is dependent on the move made by the agency.  
 
Because this synthetic data was generated using information from an empirical multiple-outcome 
tender, bids are expected to have demonstrated more joint production than if the data came from 
single outcome tenders.  
 
In addition to the incentives faced by landholders to focus on multiple-outcomes rather than individual 
outcomes, the eligibility requirements of the WG EcoTender disallowed some single outcome activities 
(for example non-native plantings to sequester carbon). Because the synthetic data in this model is 
modelled from the empirical data from the West Gippsland EcoTender demonstration, many 
opportunities for separately produced outcomes were excluded. The lack of separately produced 
outcomes in this dataset may lead to the benefits of multiple-outcome tenders being understated. This 
work could be extended by including data from single outcome tenders. 
 
Another limitation in this work relates to the simultaneous tender policy. It was assumed in this model 
that landholder’s selection into a tender was random. In reality it would be expected that landholders 
                                                 
14 The unit cost to both agencies will be the same as a single outcome tender if and only if there are no bids that are selected 
on both agencies rankings. Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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self-select into the tender that maximises their expected pay-off. While it is realistic to anticipate that 
landholders may not have enough information to always make this decision optimally, assuming 
random selection is likely to understate the cost-effectiveness of this mechanism. This model could be 
improved upon by including developing a more realistic method for assigning landholders to the 
separate tenders. 
 
Finally, two areas for further work arise from the discussion in the policy section. Firstly there is an 
opportunity for an investigation on transaction costs and how they affect the cost-effectiveness of 
various tender options. Secondly the relative cost-effectiveness of a ‘cost-sharing’ multiple-outcome 
tender could be investigated. 
 Economic Policy Branch: Research Paper 
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Appendix 1 - Simulation Results 
 
Table 1 Simulation results for running a multiple-outcome tender over a single outcome tender 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Tender  Mean native 
vegetation 
Mean river  Mean 
carbon 
Mean EBS  Range native 
vegetation 
Range river  Range 
carbon 





















91114  28066  36277  155455  61304 -128971  8621-53688  17797-56327  103805-227474  12%  3%-32% 
River tender  29802  47868  16344  94014  10959-53603  27204-81980  4530-30557  49574-152677  88%  39%-206% 
Carbon 
tender 
49888  21326  51625  123505  22409-84752  6016-46563  30182-74909  73472-197648  42%  17%-97% 
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Table 2 Simulation results for running a multiple-outcome tender over three consecutive tenders 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Tender  Mean native 
vegetation 
Mean river  Mean 
carbon 
Mean EBS  Range native 
vegetation 
Range river  Range 
carbon 






























85221  39938  45083  170905  57939-124475  19844-70216  27291-67784  113271-248108  2%  0%-6% 
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Table 3 Simulation results for running a multiple-outcome tender over three concurrent single outcome tenders 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Tender  Mean native 
vegetation 
Mean river  Mean 
carbon 
Mean EBS  Range native 
vegetation 
Range river  Range 
carbon 

















86534  40522  46704  173760  57326-123633  19814-75853  27766-69353  116109-252330  N/A  N/A 
Separate 
Tenders 
56365  32126  34257  123359  27191-93218  13641-59945  16375-58422  65261-209917  42%  12%-100% 
 
1)  The mean native vegetation score obtained over the simulation data. 
2)  The mean native river score obtained over the simulation data. 
3)  The mean native carbon score obtained over the simulation data. 
4)  The mean native Environmental Benefit Score (EBS) obtained over the simulation data where the EBS is the sum of the scores for 
native vegetation, river and carbon. 
5)  The lowest simulation value for native vegetation to the highest simulation value for native vegetation. 
6)  The lowest simulation value for river to the highest simulation value for river. 
7)  The lowest simulation value for carbon to the highest simulation value for carbon. 
8)  The lowest simulation value for EBS to the highest simulation value for EBS. 
9)  Percentage increase in mean EBS (4) using from a multiple-outcome tender over the alternative. 
10) The lowest to highest values obtained in the simulation for the percentage increase in EBS (4) from using a multiple-outcome 
tender over the alternative. 